Consumers are increasingly using the Internet to minimize the uncertainties regarding important decisions relating to their health. Physicians also show interest in delivering their expertise online, despite the inability to physically inspect their patients. In this research we use a gametheoretic model to study the optimal channel strategies of capacity-constrained experts who provide consultation services via a face-to-face and an online channel. Consumers can be in two different states (good or bad) about which experts observe a number of symptoms. We show that an expert can charge a higher price online than face-to-face and still find consumers willing to use this new service. If both channels are utilized, consumers who are more certain about their states are served online. The optimal price of an online consultation increases with the time required for this type of service. We discuss the issues experts need to consider in pricing their services and why offering online consultations make economic sense. Medical experts can use the insights derived from the model to simultaneously manage face-to-face and online channels in selling their expertise.
Introduction
E-health is touted as the future of health care, promising to transform the way health care entities conduct business and change the way patients relate to health care providers. E-health is growing more pervasive among physicians and patients alike. The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports that 93 million Americans have gone online for health information by December 2002 [ 17] . Six million Americans seek medical advice on the Internet every day.
According to a Harris Interactive Report, 37 percent of adult Internet users in 2002 were willing to pay to communicate online with their physicians [ 34] . While consumers demand the convenience of communicating online with their doctors, the absence of physical inspection and face-to-face dialogue may create risks for medical experts by reducing their diagnosis accuracy.
Still, experts offer online access to their services. A study of 1,200 physicians conducted by Deloitte and Touche and Fulcrum Analytics indicated that 23% of physicians used e-mail to communicate with their patients in 2002 [ 14] . Doctors expect to be reimbursed an average of $57 for an e-consultation. Recently, more than a dozen health insurers in several states have begun reimbursing doctors for online consultations with patients [ 35] .
A recent report by the Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm, states that "patients should receive care whenever they need it and in many forms, not just face-to-face visits…access to care should be provided over the Internet, by telephone, and by other means" [ 11, p. 61] . Apart from the convenience, major benefits of online consultations for patients include a greater degree of control over medical records, the ability to compose questions better and save e-mails to re-read instructions, a less intimidating venue due to the "relative anonymity," which allows some level of disinhibition for patients to ask questions they may not have otherwise. Of course, emergencies and other time-sensitive issues, such as chest pain, demanded medical experts offer online consultations regarding medical conditions that can be treated online? What should be the optimal online diagnosis policy? Which types of consumers should be served face-to-face and which types online? What is the optimal pricing policy for the two channels? The answers to these questions would guide medical providers about when to adopt and how to utilize Web-based consultation services.
The above questions are broadly related to three areas of research: telemedicine, multichannel management, and expert services. Despite the recent popularity of telemedicine, there is little research that analyzes its cost-effectiveness with respect to alternative approaches using a sound methodology. Instead, research on telemedicine is mainly conducted to answer the question "Can we do this?", leaving the important question "Should we do this?" unanswered [ 26] . The economic studies in this area repeatedly indicate avoidance of travel or of patient transfer as one of the most salient benefits of telemedicine, but most of these studies have methodological limitations and the generalizability of findings are rather limited [ 19, 20] .
The literature on multi-channel management examines how firms should utilize online and traditional channels simultaneously [ 7, 10, 22, 23, 30, 32, 36, 38] . Focused primarily on the retail sector, the main motivation of this stream has been to understand the issues that arise due to the emergence of the Internet, including the conflict between direct and indirect sales channels, management of communications strategies and consumer segmentation, impact of network externalities and switching costs, and competition with new, pure-play competitors.
Prominent studies on electronic commerce also examine the way the Internet changes the nature of competition and firms' interaction with consumers in markets with differentiated product offerings [ 2, 4, 21, 24, 25] . Since medical experts are also confronted with the problem of managing face-to-face and online channels simultaneously, the above studies are relevant to this study. However, consultations served by experts are substantially different from retail goods.
Consultations are essentially private information goods. Previous information systems research has examined public information goods, such as software and music, which require a significant sunk cost to produce but only a negligible cost to reproduce [ 3, 9, 13] . In contrast, a private information good is produced for a specific consumer only, typically with the objective of diagnosing a problem and possibly suggesting a service to eliminate the problem. The economics literature on private information markets focuses on information problems that beset the relationship between an expert and his customers in the traditional face-to-face channel. In some circumstances the customer may not observe the type of service provided, which may allow the expert to defraud the customer by misrepresenting a low-cost service as a costly one [ 29, 37] . In other circumstances the customer may observe the actual service provided, but not necessarily whether the more costly service was really needed [ 1, 5, 12, 15, 16, 33] . Also, the diagnostic effort of the expert may not be observable and the success of the service may not be verifiable [ 28] .
While the above information problems are important in their own right, several studies abstract away from them in the interest of isolating a certain feature of private information markets. For example, Sarvary [ 31] and Ozdemir et al. [ 27] study the pricing of expert information in a duopoly market and show that high-quality information sellers may specialize in second opinions. Bouckaert and Degryse [ 6] study the pricing and quality competition in private markets while focusing only on the face-to-face channel. In a similar vein, we do not emphasize the potential of fraud in this study simply because these problems have already been discussed in the literature and the manner in which they work is relatively well understood. Although we do not explicitly consider fraud (moral hazard) in this paper, we do incorporate the costs associated with misdiagnosing consumer problems.
This study takes an economic perspective and contributes to telemedicine research by addressing the question of "When should we do it?" It also aims to connect the literature on multi-channel management and private information markets. Our main contribution to the literature is the explicit consideration of optimal diagnosis policies, pricing strategies, and profitability when consulting face-to-face and online. We derive and discuss implications for highly demanded experts about how they should manage the two channels simultaneously. In doing this we first setup a game-theoretic model and derive the value of a consultation for consumers and the expected cost of diagnosis errors for experts. Next, we obtain expressions for simultaneously determined optimal channel and diagnosis strategies and discuss the optimal pricing strategies of experts. Interestingly, we find that the optimal price for an online consultation may exceed that of a face-to-face consultation, but improvements in online consultation technology reduce the optimal price while expanding the size of patient pool and increasing optimal profits. Experts can charge a higher price online because, as long as the online visit is more convenient than a face-to-face one, there exists a segment of consumers who value the online visit more. This observation implies that, in the absence of a fixed cost for adopting the online channel, experts should always offer online consultations. We also show that the quality of communication impacts the accuracy of an expert more when diagnosing consumers whose states exhibit more uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We setup the model in Section 2 and solve it in Section 3. A discussion of the results, limitations, and future work is provided in Section 4.
Model Formulation
To illustrate the model we use the example of experts who sell their professional opinions to a set of consumers. The consumers are uncertain about their individual states, which may be either good ( g ) or bad ( b ). A potential disadvantage of the online channel is that experts are likely to receive less information about consumers' problems when inspecting from a distance. For example, it is very hard, if not impossible, to diagnose a patient online when a physical exam is necessary.
However, there can be cases where the expert receives more information via the online channel, especially when consumers feel more comfortable in sharing personal information in the absence of the expert (e.g., in discussing sexual problems). We measure the quality of information Each signal experts receive is drawn independently from the cumulative probability 
. Similarly, the likelihood the expert says the consumer is in the good state when the consumer is actually in the bad state is
Hence, given the prior likelihood of the bad state  , the expected cost of Type I and Type II errors for a diagnosis provided via
The value of a consultation depends on how much it improves a consumer's expected utility. With no consultation with an expert, consumers can maintain the unit utility only if the state is good, and therefore they expect a utility of  
Denote the diagnosis of the expert delivered via channel j by j d . If the expert diagnoses the bad state, the consumer takes the treatment, incurs t c , and maintains the unit utility. If the expert diagnoses the good state, the consumer can not take the treatment regardless of the prior likelihood of the bad state, and she maintains the unit utility with probability  
In other words, if the expert diagnoses the good state, the consumers loses the unit utility with the probability of the state being actually bad given the diagnosis
. Upon obtaining the consultation via channel j (and incurring the transaction cost j t ), the consumer's expected
Rearranging the terms we obtain
The value of a consultation equals the expected utility post consultation 
indicates that the value of a consultation increases both with the prior likelihood of the bad state and the accuracy of the expert in correctly predicting the bad state.
On the other hand, the value decreases with the cost of the treatment itself and with the likelihood that the expert mistakenly suggests unnecessary treatment. That is, the importance of a misdiagnosis compounds when the cost of treatment is high. Because the expert is more likely to misdiagnose a consumer's state when j n is low, and since one would expect o n to be less than f n in most cases due to the absence of physical inspection, the expert is less likely to utilize online consultations when stakes are high for consumers. 
The Optimal Diagnosis and Channel Strategies
In order to get the highest return for labor, each expert selects the group of customers who value his service most and sets a diagnosis policy. For an expert to utilize the Internet, some of these customers should prefer to be served online. Intuitively, online consultations should be more appealing when the face-to-face transaction cost   f t is greater than its online counterpart   o t .
However, as we show in Proposition 1, there exists a segment of consumers that prefer an online consultation to a face-to-face one as long as o f t t  . This leads experts to always offer the online service. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Given o f t t  , there exists a segment of consumers with high a who value an online consultation more than a face-to-face one.
We can now focus on the optimal channel and diagnosis policies, which are determined simultaneously. Corollary 1 establishes that, whenever an expert offers both services, consumers with a high  prefer the online service while those with a low  prefer the face-to-face one.
For example, consider the special case 1   where both the consumer and the expert know with certainty that the state is bad. Since there is no room for diagnosis error in this special case, and given that the consumer can obtain the same treatment on both channels, the channel preference will be based solely on convenience, and the consumer will prefer online over face-to-face consultation. However, as the prior likelihood of the bad state decreases, the probability of a misdiagnosis increases at a faster rate online than face-to-face if the quality of communication is
, and so the consumer may prefer a face-to-face consultation below a threshold  value. The proof of Corollary 1 is also in the Appendix.
Corollary 1. Given o f t t  , whenever an expert offers both services (which happens only when o f n n  ), consumers with high (low)  values prefer the online (face-to-face) service.
Patients with chronic health problems illustrate this point. Online consultations are reported to be especially useful for patients who have chronic conditions such as diabetes, asthma, hypertension, and heart problems [ 18] . Therefore, these services can be successfully offered to chronic disease populations for whom prescription refills, appointments, and laboratory tests are most frequent, rather than to healthy populations with intermittent illnesses requiring diagnostic evaluation. According to Harris Interactive, 71 percent of American adults who have Internet access prefer to get new prescriptions online for medications they already take [ 34] . Clearly, patients do not prefer to physically visit the doctor's office when their conditions as well as the necessary treatment are known a priori.
According to Corollary 1, each expert serves to consumers with high  values as long as treatment can be provided both face-to-face and online. Denote the lowest  value among the consumers served by expert i by i  . In addition, assuming expert i offers consultations on both channels at optimality, denote the cutoff  value above which the expert serves online by i  . Since the expert works at capacity:
According to Corollary 2, the consumer with i    prefers a face-to-face consultation when both channels are used. Therefore, the highest the expert can charge to this consumer for a faceto-face consultation while working at capacity is
Taking as given the costs of Type I and Type II errors and the distribution of prior likelihoods of the bad state, expert i decides which customers to serve online/face-to-face and which diagnosis policy to employ on each channel. This decision in turn determines the price that can be charged for the two types of services. By definition, the online and face-to-face prices of the expert make the consumer with i    indifferent between obtaining a face-to-face and online consultation:
Plugging in the value of i f p we have 
Since the optimal i  determines the optimal i  , we only need to maximize with respect to i  .
We obtain the following equality from the first-order condition for
Similarly, the expert sets the optimal cutoff policies shows that an expert should handle more consumers online as  decreases. Here again the time benefit of online consultations becomes an important factor when the expert has a relatively high demand. The expert may start serving less online below a certain  value since a low  substantially increases the expert's capacity and limits his ability to charge a high price in the absence of price discrimination.
[ Figure 1 is approximately here.]
, the increased utilization of the online channel due to a high o n also increases the number of consumers served and thereby puts a downward pressure on prices (see Figure 2(a) ). If the demand and o n is sufficiently large, the expert can operate entirely via the online channel. In this case a further increase in o n does not increase the number of consumers served, and the expert raises his online price to take advantage of further improvements in 4 Figures 1 and 2 are drawn using the following parameter values: However, since profits increase at a higher rate when capacity is more limited relative to the demand, we conjecture that medical experts that are most pressed for time will benefit more from online consultations and should seriously consider adoption as technology improves.
[ Figure 2 is approximately here.] [ Figure 3 is approximately here.]
Discussion and Conclusions
Past research on telemedicine mainly addresses the question "Can we do this?", leaving the important question "Should we do this?" unanswered [ 26] . We believe that this important question should be tackled from the perspective of providers while taking into account their physical operations. Therefore, the study of optimal channel management strategies of experts provided here, while significant in its own right, is uniquely positioned at the interface of the literatures on telemedicine, multi-channel management, and expert services.
We have modeled the diagnosis problem of experts as that of selecting the state of a consumer under uncertainty, where the diagnosis accuracy depends critically on the quality of communication in a consultation. Experts face different levels of demand, are capacityconstrained, and can consult both face-to-face and online. Consumers maximize expected surplus while experts maximize profit. The insights we obtain from this model offer several practical implications that can help experts in setting the extent of their online offerings and deciding who to serve online within their specialty given their patient portfolio. For example, according to a recent Harris Interactive survey, most physicians have serious reservations about consulting online because of concerns about reimbursement, among others [ 34] . This research shows that experts can always find consumers who would be willing to pay more for an online service than a face-to-face one. Interestingly, physicians may still have to charge a lower price online at optimality in order to serve a larger patient pool. As the online consultation technology improves, physicians may have to charge even less online but would earn more, especially if they are facing a high demand and therefore are pressed for time. Also, medical experts should target their online services to consumers with more certain health conditions because the potentially negative effect of communication quality would be more pronounced when inspecting patients with more uncertain state expectations.
Of course, the stylized model considered here applies only to certain situations. For example, we have only considered the case where the process of getting an online consultation is more convenient than getting a face-to-face one   o f t t  , disregarding in the process the medical conditions that render obtaining and sending personal information prohibitively costly for patients. Still, our analysis covers many situations because of the recent advances in telemedicine technologies that ease the collection and transfer of patient information. Today's technologies enable doctors to monitor their patients' every heartbeat as they go about their daily activities. Even in the most remote locations, sensors connected to patients can beam images and signals to medical experts at distant centers for real-time consultations, diagnoses and monitoring. Second, we have assumed the fixed cost of adopting online consultations to be zero because physicians only need basic Internet connection to offer these services (e.g., using
Medem's secure messaging suite of tools), and the cost of an Internet connection is negligible compared to many other cost items in health care. Of course, certain types of consultations may require special technical equipment. In psychiatry, for example, videoconferencing equipment may be necessary to get a good sense of patients' problems. In such circumstances the optimal investment in online consultation technology would become another important decision, which could be investigated in future research by extending the current model in a way that would associate the amount of investment in the technology to the quality of communication. 
